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the existing chosen-key model through two concrete OFE schemes that serve as counterexamples.
Finally, we revisit two existing generic constructions of optimistic fair exchange schemes, one based on
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Abstract
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) is a kind of protocol to guarantee fairness
for the parties involved in an exchange with the help of an arbitrator. A
fundamental work of optimistic fair exchange is to define security models
capturing realistic attacks and design schemes secure in practical models.
The security models are very essential to ensure that they capture practical
situation, which will ensure that the protocols can be adopted in practice.
The contributions of this paper are three fold. First, we observe that
the existing OFE models do not capture realistic situation, where the adversary can actually observe the full signatures generated by the signer, prior
to launching the actual attack. That is to say, the adversary is not provided with the signing oracle, which will produce full signatures generated
by the signer. It is commonly believed that the full signatures generated
by the signer can be simulated by the full signatures generated by the arbitrator. Unfortunately, we show that this perception is false. Second, we
propose an enhanced model of OFE that explicitly provides the adversary
with the signing oracle, which outputs the full signatures generated by the
signer. We demonstrate the difference between our enhanced model and the
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existing chosen-key model through two concrete OFE schemes that serve as
counterexamples. Finally, we revisit two existing generic constructions of optimistic fair exchange schemes, one based on verifiably encrypted signatures,
and the other based on conventional signatures and ring signatures. Our
result shows that the two generic approaches can still offer schemes secure in
our enhanced model, which captures the real scenario that dishonest users
may have access to the full signatures generated by the signer.
Keywords: Optimistic Fair Exchange, Chosen-key Model, Enhanced Model
1. Introduction
Nowadays electronic commerce grows rapidly and assumes increasing importance. A significant issue for electronic commerce is how to exchange
digital items in a fair way so that either each party receives the other’s item
or neither party does. Since digital items are normally not revocable, i.e.
once the digital item has been sent then there is no means to revoke or cancel it, the exchange of digital items should happen simultaneously to achieve
fairness for both involved parties. Unfortunately, real simultaneity in general cannot be realized, since the transmission of any data requires time.
Moreover, the networks where the exchange takes place may be insecure and
there is no assurance that the digital item will eventually be delivered to the
intended recipient.
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE), first introduced by Asokan, Schunter and
Waidner [1] in 1997, is a kind of protocol to solve the fair exchange problem
with the help of a trusted third party named “an arbitrator”. In such a
protocol, the arbitrator is used in an effective manner in the sense that it only
involves to solve the disputes between participants, while in the vast majority
of transactions, the arbitrator does not need to be involved at all. Consider
the scenario that Alice is willing to sign some statements, for instance, an
electronic check, in exchange for Bob’s fulfillment of some obligation (delivers
some digital good, for example). By adopting an optimistic fair exchange
protocol, this exchange can be summarized as a three-step process. Alice,
usually called the signer, firstly sends a partial signature to Bob, usually
called the verifier. The partial signature assures Bob that the arbitrator is
able to convert it into a full one. Then Bob fulfills his obligation. Later,
Alice should send her full signature to complete the exchange. In the case
Alice refuses to do so, Bob can ask the arbitrator to make a resolution, who
2

will convert Alice’s partial signature into a full one and send it back to Bob.
In an OFE scheme, the full signatures generated by the signer and those
generated by the arbitrator based on the signer’s partial signature are both
viewed as the signer’s valid full signatures and represent the signer’s commitment on some statements. However, they does not necessarily to be the
same. Following the terms in [2], full signatures generated by the signer are
called actual signatures and full signatures generated by the arbitrator are
called resolved signatures.
1.1. Previous Work and Related Notions
Optimistic fair exchange has a long history due to its fundamental role in
electronic commerce. It is well-known that optimistic fair exchange schemes
can be constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] and
sequential two-party multisignatures [9]. It has been widely accepted that
optimistic fair exchange schemes should have the property called “resolution
ambiguity” [9, 10, 11], namely the actual signatures generated by the signer
should be at least computationally indistinguishable from the resolved signatures generated by the arbitrator. As the intervention of an arbitrator
could be caused by a network failure rather than by the cheating of a signer,
an optimistic fair exchange scheme with resolution ambiguity property can
avoid bad publicity for the signer. In the following, we mainly review the
attempts in defining security models capturing possible practical attacks for
optimistic fair exchange schemes, as they are mostly relevant to this paper.
Early optimistic fair exchange protocols was studied in the single-user
setting and the security model assumed only one signer and one verifier. The
first formal security model was proposed in [1, 3] but failed to consider the
case where the arbitrator itself may be dishonest. A more generalized model
in the single-user setting was suggested by Dodis and Reyzin [9] to take into
account a dishonest arbitrator.
Since there are many users who may share the same arbitrator in the
real world, the security model in the single-user setting does not capture
the possible attacks by colluding dishonest users. In PKC 2007, Dodis, Lee
and Yum [10] considered the multi-user security of optimistic fair exchange
which allows dishonest users to collude to cheat another user. They separated the security of optimistic fair exchange between single-user setting and
multi-user setting by showing that an optimistic fair exchange instance provably secure in the single-user setting is not secure in the multi-user setting.
Independently, this was also studied by Zhu, Susilo and Mu in 2007 [12].
3

Since then, the security of optimistic fair exchange intuitively covers the
following three aspects.
• Security against signers: the signer should not be able to generate a
partial signature that can not be converted into a full one by the honest
arbitrator.
• Security against verifiers: the verifier should not be able to generate a
full signature of the signer’s by himself/herself.
• Security against the arbitrator: the arbitrator should not be able to
generate a full signature on behalf of the signer without observing a
corresponding partial one.
Most optimistic fair exchange protocols have been studied in the certifiedkey model (also known as the registered-key model [13]). In this model, it is
assumed that the authenticity of public keys are verifiable and each user in
the system should show its knowledge of the corresponding secret key in the
public key registration stage to resist key substitution attacks. That is to
say, in this model, the dishonest signer and the dishonest arbitrator have to
show their knowledge of their corresponding secret keys, and the dishonest
verifier can only make resolution queries with respect to the target signer
and other public keys whose secret keys are known.
However, in the public key infrastructure, when a certification authority
issues a certificate of a user’s public key, the user is not required to show its
knowledge of the secret key. Thus the certified-key model is not practical
enough, as it relies on a stronger assumption than the normal authenticity
assumption placed on the certification authority.
In CT-RSA 2008, Huang, Yang, Wong and Susilo [11] studied the security
of optimistic fair exchange in the chosen-key model, in which the adversary
can adversarially select public keys without knowing the corresponding secret
key. This model provides more realistic power to the adversary in attacking the honest users. On the one hand, the adversary can choose its own
public key without knowing the corresponding secret key. Specifically, in the
security against the arbitrator, the dishonest arbitrator is even allowed to
set its own public key after knowing the target signer’s public key. In the
certified-key model, however, the dishonest arbitrator has to set its key pair
before seeing the target signer’s public key. On the other hand, for a dishonest signer or verifier, the adversary is allowed to make resolution queries
4

with respect to arbitrary public keys, without knowing the corresponding
secret keys. They demonstrated, through a counterexample, that a provably secure fair exchange in the certified-key model may not be secure in the
chosen-key model. A generic optimistic fair exchange construction secure in
the chosen-key model based on conventional signatures and ring signatures
was also proposed.
1.2. Motivation: the need for the signing oracle in the security model
The most fundamental work of OFE is to define security models, that
capture realistic attacks. Based on these models, secure schemes will be
subsequently designed. These security models are very essential to ensure
that they capture practical situation, which will ensure that the protocols
can be adopted in practice. We observe that the existing OFE models in fact
do not capture realistic situation, where the adversary (i.e. the dishonest
verifiers or the dishonest arbitrator) can actually observe the full signatures
generated by the signer before launching the actual attack. This realistic
situation implies that in the security model, the adversary should have been
provided with the signing oracle, which will produce full signatures generated
by the signer.
In all the proposed optimistic fair exchange models, in the security against
the arbitrator, the dishonest arbitrator is only given a partial signing oracle,
which takes as input a message and outputs the target signer’s partial signature on this message. Furthermore, in the security against the verifier, the
dishonest verifier is given the partial signing oracle and a resolution oracle,
which takes as input a partial signature and outputs a resolved signature.
We note that the two aspects of the OFE security have the common feature
that the adversary (the dishonest verifiers or the dishonest arbitrator) is not
provided the access to the actual signatures. This situation in fact separates the security models of OFE schemes from the realistic situation, which
may result in the insecurity of the scheme in practice, which will hinder the
adoption of OFE in practice.
To date, it is commonly believed that there is no need to provide the
dishonest arbitrator with the signing oracle, as the dishonest arbitrator can
generate a full signature by first gaining a partial signature from the partial
signing oracle and then converting it into a full one using its own secret key.
Similarly, in the models of security against the verifier, the dishonest verifier is given the partial signing oracle and a resolution oracle, which takes
as input a partial signature and outputs a full signature, as it is commonly
5

acknowledged that the signer can gain a full signature by first requesting a
partial signature from the partial signing oracle and then asking the resolution oracle to convert it into a full one. Unfortunately, by carefully analyzing
the existing models, we notice that the above models at most allow the adversary (the dishonest arbitrator or the dishonest verifier) to gain the partial
signatures and the resolved signatures generated by the arbitrator. For a
malicious arbitrator who generates its public key based on a target signer
and may have no knowledge of its own secret key, it may not even be able to
get a resolved signature. Hence, the real scenario that an adversary may also
have access to the actual signatures generated by the signer is not captured.
The crux of the issue in the security models is the lack of signing oracle
access, which has been believed to be unnecessary since the partial signing
oracle and the resolution oracle have been provided.
Furthermore, we observe that the notion of resolution ambiguity does not
imply that signing oracle is helpless to the adversary. The distinguisher in the
definition of resolution ambiguity is not equipped with any power, i.e. it is not
offered with any oracle access, not to mention the arbitrator’s secret key. In
other words, the resolution ambiguity property only guarantees a preliminary
level of computational indistinguishability between the actual signature and
the resolved signature. There is no guarantee that the actual signature is
still computationally indistinguishable from the resolved signature in the
view of the dishonest verifier, who can have partial signing oracle access and
resolution oracle access, let alone in the view of the dishonest arbitrator,
who can have partial signing oracle access and choose the arbitration key
pair himself.
1.3. Our Contributions
In this paper we propose a new security model for optimistic fair exchange
that for the first time provides an adversary with the signing oracle, which
takes as input a message and outputs the actual signatures. Compared with
the existing models, our model explicitly captures the real scenario that an
adversary may have access to the full signatures generated by the signer. We
call our new security model as an enhanced chosen-key model, which can be
viewed as an enhancement of the model of [11].
Next, to show the necessity of our enhanced model, in Section 5, we show
that, even for a honest but curious arbitrator (the arbitrator correctly generates its key pair and knows its own secret arbitration key), the security in the
multi-user setting and chosen-key model does not imply that in our enhanced
6

model with a concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme that serves as a counterexample. In other words, the current definition of resolution ambiguity
(the actual signatures generated by the signer should be computationally
indistinguishable from the resolved signatures generated by the arbitrator)
fails to guarantee that deprivation of the signing oracle is reasonable.
Since the current definition of resolution ambiguity fails to justify the
absence of the signing oracle, a natural and straightforward question would
be “if we further strengthen the definition of resolution ambiguity, would it
be possible to fill the gap between our enhanced model and existing model?”
Unfortunately, the answer is no. Specifically, in Section 6, we demonstrate
that, for a malicious arbitrator (the arbitrator adversarially chooses its arbitration public key and without knowing the corresponding secret key), a
provably secure fair exchange in the existing model is not secure in our enhanced model, even if the definition of resolution ambiguity is strengthened
to the highest level, i.e., the actual signatures generated by the signer and
the resolved signatures generated by the arbitrator have the identical distribution. This answer about the question firmly certifies the significance of
our proposal of the enhanced chosen-key model.
Since our enhanced model is more realistic and provides the adversary
with an extra power of querying the signing oracle, a natural and fundamental
question would be whether or not a scheme secure in our enhanced model
exists. We provide an affirmative answer to this question in Section 7 by
showing that fortunately two well-known generic construction of optimistic
fair exchange (one is based on verifiably encrypted signatures, and the other
is based on conventional signatures and ring signatures) can still result in
schemes secure in our enhanced model.
2. Cryptographic Notions and Assumptions
In this section, we review several well known notions and computational
assumptions that will be used throughout the paper.
Definition 1. (Negligible function). A function µ : N → R is negligible if
for any positive integer c there exists an integer Nc such that for all k > Nc ,
µ(k) <
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Definition 2. (Computational Indistinguishability). Two distribution families {Xk }k∈N and {Yk }k∈N are computationally indistinguishable if for every
probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A, the following quantity
µ(k) =

Pr [A(x) = 1] − Pr [A(x) = 1]
x∈Yk

x∈Xk

is a negligible function in k.
2.1. Bilinear pairing
Let G, GT be two cyclic groups of the same order p for some large prime
p. We say that e is a bilinear map [14] if e : G × G → GT satisfies the
following properties.
• (Bilinearity) For all elements of g, h ∈ G, a, b ∈ ZZp , it holds that
e(g a , hb ) = e(g, h)ab .
• (Non-degeneracy) There exists g, h ∈ G such that e(g, h) is not the
identity element of GT .
• (Efficiency) The group operation in G and the map e are both efficiently
computable.
2.2. Complexity Assumptions
Let G be of prime order p ≥ 2k , where k is a security parameter. Let g
be a generator of G, and u be a random element of G. Let further x be a
random element in ZZp and Q =< g, g x , u, {(g 1/(x+si ) , g si , usi )}qi=1 > where si
is uniformly randomly chosen from ZZp for 1 ≤ i ≤ q. Below we review three
computational assumptions that will be throughout this paper.
Definition 3. (q-SDH Assumption [15]). The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (qSDH) assumption holds for G if for every probabilistic polynomial time ad2
q
versary A with input (g, g x , g x , · · · , g x ), the advantage of A in computing
1
a tuple (s, g x+s )
2

q

1

AdvA (k) = Pr[A(g, g x , g x , · · · , g x ) = (s, g x+s )]
is negligible in k.
8

Definition 4. (q-HSDH Assumption [16]). The q-Hidden Strong Diffie-Hellman
(q-HSDH) assumption holds for G if for every probabilistic polynomial time
adversary A with input Q, the advantage of A in computing another triple
(g 1/(x+s) , g s , us )
AdvA (k) = Pr[A(Q) = (g 1/(x+s) , g s , us )]
is negligible in k, where s ∈ ZZp and s 6∈ {s1 , · · · , sq }.
Definition 5. (q-DHSDH Assumption [17]). The q-Decisional Hidden Strong
Diffie-Hellman (q-DHSDH) assumption holds for G if for every probabilistic
polynomial time adversary A, the advantage of A in distinguishing (Q, us ,
g 1/(x+s) ) from (Q, us , Z)
AdvA (k) = Pr[A(Q, us , g 1/(x+s) ) = 1] − Pr[A(Q, us , Z) = 1]
is negligible in k, where s is a random element in ZZp and Z is a random
element of G.

3. Definition of Optimistic Fair Exchange
In this section, we review the definition for a non-interactive optimistic
fair exchange (OFE) in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model [11].
Definition 6. A non-interactive optimistic fair exchange scheme involves
users (signers and verifiers) and the arbitrator, and consists of the following
(probabilistic) polynomial-time algorithms:
• SetupTTP : This algorithm is run by the arbitrator to generate its secret
key ASK and public key APK on input security parameter 1k .
• SetupUser : This algorithm is run by a user to generate its secret key
SK and public key PK. For a user Ui , we use (SKi , PKi ) to denote its
key pair. The input of this algorithm is the security parameter 1k and
(optionally) APK.
• Sig and Ver: These two algorithms are used to generate and verify a
full signature respectively. Sig(m, SKi , APK) was run by the signer Ui
to output a full signature σ on message m, while Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK),
run by a verifier, outputs > or ⊥, indicating σ is a valid full signature
generated by the signer Ui on m or not.
9

• PSig and PVer: These two algorithms are used to generate and verify a
partial signature respectively. PSig(m, SKi , APK) was run by the signer
Ui to output a partial signature σP on message m, while PVer(m, σP ,
PKi , APK), run by a verifier, outputs > or ⊥.
• Res: This algorithm is run by the arbitrator to make a resolution.
Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi ) outputs either a full signature σ on message m
with respect to the partial signature, or ⊥ indicating failure.
Correctness of an OFE scheme means that the verification algorithms
function properly if the inputs are generated honestly. More formally, it
means that
Ver(m, Sig(m, SKi , APK), PKi , APK) = >,
PVer(m, PSig(m, SKi , APK), PKi , APK) = >, and
Ver(m, Res(m, PSig(m, SKi , APK), ASK, PKi ), PKi , APK) = >.
Resolution ambiguity property states that any “resolved signature” outputted
by the algorithm Res(m, PSig(m, SKi , APK), ASK, PKi ) run by the arbitrator
is computationally indistinguishable from the “actual signature” outputted by
algorithm Sig(m, SKi , APK) run by the signer.
We emphasize that in the definition of resolution ambiguity, the distinguisher does not have any adaptive adversarial capability. Specifically, the
distinguisher is neither provided with any oracle access nor the arbitrator’s
secret key. Thus, the resolution ambiguity property only guarantees a preliminary level of computational indistinguishability between the actual signature
and the resolved signature. There is no guarantee that the actual signature
is still computationally indistinguishable from the resolved signature in the
view of an adversary who can have partial signing oracle access and resolution oracle access, let alone an adversary, who can have partial signing oracle
access and the arbitrator’s secret key.
3.1. Security in Multi-User setting and Chosen-key Model
The security in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model [11] guarantees
the highest level of security for optimistic fair exchange in literatures. Typically, the security consists of three aspects: security against signers, security
against verifiers, and security against the arbitrator, which considered the
10

cases when the signer, the verifier and the arbitrator are dishonest, respectively. We review this security model below.
SECURITY AGAINST SIGNERS. To guarantee that no signer can gain advantage over the verifier, we require the probability that any PPT adversary
A succeeds in the following experiment is negligible in k.
SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, APK)
(m, σP , PK∗ ) ← AORes (APK)
σ ← Res(m, σP , ASK, PK∗ )


PVer(m, σP , PK∗ , APK) = >
success of A :=
Ver(m, σ, PK∗ , APK) = ⊥
In this experiment, ORes is the resolution oracle, which takes as input a
message m, a partial signature σP and a signer’s public key PKi and returns
the output of the algorithm Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi ). In the resolution oracle
queries, the adversary can make queries with respect to any adversarially
chosen public key, without requiring to know the corresponding secret key.
This aspect of security guarantees that no signer should be able to produce
a partial signature that can be verified as valid but cannot be resolved into
a valid full one by the honest arbitrator.
SECURITY AGAINST VERIFIERS. To guarantee that no verifier can gain
advantage over the signer, we require the probability that any PPT adversary
A succeeds in the following experiment is negligible in k.
SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, APK)
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, PK)
(m, σ) ← AOPSig ,ORes (PK, APK)


Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >
success of A :=
(m, ·) 6∈ Query(A, ORes )
In this experiment, Query(A, ORes ) is the set of queries made by A to the
resolution oracle ORes , which is the same as described in the experiment of
security against signers. The partial signing oracle OPSig takes as input a
message m and outputs a partial signature σP generated using the challenge
signer’s secret key SK. This aspect of security guarantees that no verifier
should be able to generate a full signature or convert any partial signature
σP into a full one by himself. It is widely believed that there is no need
11

to provide A with access to the signing oracle OSig , which takes as input a
message m and outputs a full signature σ on m generated using the challenge
signer’s secret key SK, as it seems that a full signature outputted by OSig
could be simulated by using the oracles OPSig and ORes .
SECURITY AGAINST THE ARBITRATOR. To prevent the arbitrator from
issuing full signatures on behalf of the signature arbitrarily, we require that
the probability that any PPT adversary A succeeds in the following experiment is negligible in k.
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, PK)
(ASK∗ , APK) ← A(PK)
(m, σ) ← AOPSig (ASK∗ , APK, PK)


Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >
success of A :=
m 6∈ Query(A, OPSig )
In this experiment, ASK∗ is A’s state information, which might not be the
corresponding secret key of APK. Query(A, OPSig ) is the set of queries made
by A to the partial signing oracle OPSig , which is the same as defined in the
previous experiment. This aspect of security guarantees that the arbitrator
should not be able to produce a full signature on behalf of the signer on any
message, unless the signer has already generated a partial signature on that
message. As in the experiment of security against verifiers, the adversary
is not given the signing oracle access, as it is believed that the adversary
can gain a full signature by firstly receiving a partial signature from the
partial signing oracle and then converting it into a full one by using the
secret arbitrator key. We emphasize that in the experiment, the adversary
can adaptively set APK after it is given the challenge signer’s public key PK
and it may have no knowledge of the corresponding private key of APK.
4. The Enhanced Chosen-key Model
As discussed in the introduction, the actual signature generated by the
signer may be different from the resolved signature generated by the arbitrator based on a corresponding partial one. Thus, it seems natural and
straightforward that a security model should capture the real scenario that
an adversary may observe the actual signatures generated by the signer. To
explicitly take this case into account, we propose the following enhanced
12

chosen-key model, i.e., in the experiments of security against verifiers and
security against the arbitrator, we offer the adversary with the signing oracle
access.
SECURITY AGAINST VERIFIERS. We require the probability that any
PPT adversary A succeeds in the following experiment is negligible in k.
SetupTTP (1k ) → (ASK, APK)
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, PK)
(m, σ) ← AOPSig ,OSig ,ORes (PK, APK)


Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >
success of A :=  (m, ·) 6∈ Query(A, ORes ) 
m 6∈ Query(A, OSig )
where OPSig , ORes and Query(A, ORes ) are the same as that in the existing
model reviewed in Section 3.1, oracle OSig takes as input a message m and
outputs a full signature σ on m generated using the challenge signer’s secret
key SK, and Query(A, OSig ) is the set of queries made by A to oracle OSig .
SECURITY AGAINST THE ARBITRATOR. We require that the probability that any PPT adversary A succeeds in the following experiment is
negligible in k.
SetupUser (1k ) → (SK, PK)
(ASK∗ , APK) ← A(PK)
(m, σ) ← AOPSig ,OSig (ASK∗ , APK, PK)


Ver(m, σ, PK, APK) = >
success of A :=  m 6∈ Query(A, OPSig ) 
m 6∈ Query(A, OSig )
where ASK∗ , OPSig and Query(A, OPSig ) are the same as reviewed in the
existing model reviewed in Section 3.1, and OSig and Query(A, OSig ) are the
same as described in the above experiment.
5. Separation of the Enhanced Model and the Existing Model
In this section, we present a concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme that
is secure in the multi-user setting and chosen key model reviewed in Section 3.1 but insecure in our enhanced chosen-key model. This demonstrates
13

that the common belief that no signing oracle is required to be provided to
the adversary is insufficient. That is to say, with this counterexample, we can
safely arrive to the conclusion that the existing models fail to capture the real
scenario that an adversary may have access to the signers actual signatures,
and in the contrary, our enhanced chosen-key model is more complete and
practical.
Prior to proposing the concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme that will
serve as a counterexample, we will first provide a high level description.
The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme is constructed in the bilinear
pairing setting. Let e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where g is a
generator of G. The signer’s public key is X = g x and a random u ∈ G. The
arbitrator’s public key is Y = g y . The signer and the arbitrator keep their
secret keys x and y as private, respectively. Let further H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G
and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → ZZp be two hash functions that will be viewed as random
functions. The partial signature on a message m is a conventional signature
(H0 (m)1/(x+s) , g s , us ) ∈ G3 , which can be seen as a variation of the signatures
from [18, 19] in which they employ a programmable hash function [18] to
guarantee the security without random oracles.
To fully sign a message m, the signer does the following.
1. The signer firstly generates a partial signature (H0 (m)1/(x+s) , g s , us ) on
message m.
2. Let m̄ be the ‘complement’ message of m, i.e. m̄ and m are of the same
bit-length, where for each i-th bit, m̄i is the complement of mi .
3. The signer then generates a designated confirmer signature [20, 19] on
message m̄
0
0
0
(δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 ) = (H0 (m̄)1/(x+s ) , Y s , us ),
with the arbitrator being the confirmer where s0 is a random. This
confirmer signature can be seen as a variation of the confirmer signature from [19] in which the hash function H0 is replaced with a
programmable hash function.
4. Note that e(δ 0 , u)x = e(H0 (m̄), u)/e(δ 0 , θ0 ) := W . The signer finally
makes a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with respect to the message m and the signer’s public key (X, u) that it knows
the value x such that g x = X and e(δ 0 , u)x = W or it knows the arbitrator’s secret key y. The signer can always make such a proof by
using its secret key x.
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5. The full signature on message m comprises the partial signature on
m, the designated confirmer signature on m̄ and the non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
To convert a partial signature into a full one, the arbitrator uniformly
0
0
samples a designated confirmer signature (δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 ) = (Z, Y s , us ) from the
signer’s designated signature space where Z ∈ G and an exponent s0 are randomly chosen. Let W = e(H0 (m̄), u)/e(δ 0 , θ0 ). The arbitrator then makes a
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with respect to the message m and the signer’s public key (X, u) that it knows the value x such
that g x = X and e(δ 0 , u)x = W or it knows the arbitrator’s secret key y.
The arbitrator can always make the non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge using its secret key y.
Note that due to the invisibility property of a confirmer signature [20], the
designated confirmer signature sampled by the arbitrator is indistinguishable
from the one that is generated by the signer. Besides, the non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof of knowledge guarantees the proof made by the signer is
indistinguishable from the proof made by the arbitrator. Thus the resolution
ambiguity property of the concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme holds.
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, g be a generator
of G, and e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT is a multiplicative
group of order p. Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → ZZp be two hash
functions. We assume the public parameter (G, p, e, H1 , H2 ) is shared by all
users. The concrete OFE scheme is as follows.
• SetupTTP (1k ): The arbitrator chooses at random y ∈ ZZp and computes
Y = g y . The public key is set as APK = Y , and the arbitrator keeps
ASK = y as private.
• SetupUser (1k ): Each user Ui chooses uniformly at random xi ∈ ZZp
and ui ∈ G, and calculates Xi = g xi . The user sets (SKi , PKi ) =
(xi , (Xi , ui )).
• PSig(m, SKi , APK): To partially sign a message m, the user Ui chooses
a random s ∈ ZZp and returns σP := (H0 (m)1/(xi +s) , g s , usi ).
• PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK): Given a partial signature σP from user Ui , the
verifier parses σP as (δ, v, θ), and returns > if both e(v, ui ) = e(g, θ)
and e(δ, Xi v) = e(H0 (m), g) hold. Otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
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• Sig(m, SKi , APK): To fully sign a message m, the user Ui
1. chooses a random s ∈ ZZp and computes σP := (H0 (m)1/(xi +s) , g s ,
usi ).
0
2. chooses a random s0 ∈ ZZp and computes (δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 ) := (H0 (m̄)1/(xi +s ) ,
0
0
Y s , usi ) where m̄ is the ‘complement’ message of m, i.e. for each
i-th bit, m̄i is the complement of mi .
3. Denote W := e(H0 (m̄), ui )/e(δ 0 , θ0 ). Note that W = e(δ 0 , ui )xi .
The user Ui chooses uniformly at random r, c1 , t1 ∈ ZZp , and computes c = H1 (m||PKi ||g r ||e(δ 0 , ui )r ||g t1 Y c1 ), c0 = c − c1 (mod p)
and t0 = r − c0 xi (mod p).
4. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 , c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ).
• Ver(m, σ, PKi , APK): Given a full signature σ from user Ui , a verifier
does as follows.
1. Check whether c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ∈ ZZp and PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK) = >.
2. Check whether e(γ 0 , ui ) = e(Y, θ0 ).
3. Compute W = e(H0 (m̄), ui )/e(δ 0 , θ0 ) and
c = H1 (m||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||e(δ 0 , ui )t0 W c0 ||g t1 Y c1 ).
4. Verify whether c0 + c1 = c (mod p).
5. If all the above hold, > is returned and otherwise, ⊥ is returned.
• Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi ): For the user Ui ’s partial signature σP on message
m, the arbitrator
1. first checks whether PVer(m, σP , PKi ) = >. If so, continues; otherwise, returns ⊥.
2. chooses at random s0 ∈ ZZp , Z ∈ G and computes (δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 ) :=
0
0
(Z, Y s , usi ).
3. computes W = e(H0 (m̄), ui )/e(δ 0 , θ0 ) where m̄ is the complement
message of m.
4. chooses uniformly at random r, c0 , t0 ∈ ZZp , and computes
c = H1 (m||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||e(δ 0 , ui )t0 W c0 ||g r ),
c1 = c − c0 (mod p) and t1 = r − c1 y (mod p).
5. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 , c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ).
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5.1. Security Analysis in the Chosen-key model
It is straightforward to verify that in the above construction, any (partial)
signature created by Sig (PSig) will be valid under Ver (PVer), and that any
signature created by the arbitrator using Res based on a partial signature
generated by PSig will be valid under Ver. Thus, the correctness property
of the above construction holds. Based on the q-DHSDH Assumption, the
resolution ambiguity property also holds.
Next we show the specific construction is secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model reviewed in Section 3.1. Intuitively, the security
against signers holds unconditionally as the arbitrator is always able to convert a signer’s partial signature into a full one. The security against verifiers
holds due to the fact that one cannot make the proof of knowledge without
knowing the signer’s secret key or the arbitrator’s secret key. The security
against the arbitrator holds due to the unforgeability of the conventional
signature scheme that generates the partial signature.
Theorem 1. The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme is unconditionally secure against signers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model.
Proof. Obviously, for any message m and any valid signature σP on m under the verification key PKi , the arbitrator can always convert it into a full
signature by using its own secret key ASK. Therefore, the security against
signers always hold.
2
Theorem 2. The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme is secure against
verifiers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if the q-HSDH Assumption holds.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A makes q queries to the partial signing oracle
and breaks the security against verifiers with non-negligible probability. We
show how to construct an algorithm R that breaks the q-HSDH Assumption.
Note that algorithm R is given Q =< g, g x , u, {(g 1/(x+si ) , g si , usi )}qi=1 >.
Its goal is to output another distinct triple (g 1/(x+s) , g s , us ). Algorithm R simulates the challenger and interacts with adversary A. Algorithm R chooses
0
a random integer x0 ∈ ZZp , sets X 0 = g x , flips a coin and gets a random bit b.
According to the random bit b, R performs one of the following two games.
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• Game 0 (b = 0): R forwards PK := (g x , u) and APK = Y := X 0 to A
and simulates the oracles for A.
H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 .
To response to these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hmi , ai i as
explained below. We refer to this list as H0 -list. The list is initially
empty. When A queries the oracle H0 on a message mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ ,
algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the query mi already appears on the H0 -list in some tuple
hmi , ai i, then algorithm R responds with H(mi ) = g ai .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hmi , ai i
to the H0 -list and responds to A as H(mi ) = g ai .
H1 Queries. A can also query the random oracle H1 . To response to
these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hstring (i) , c(i) i as explained
below. We refer to this list as H1 -list. The list is initially empty.
When A queries the oracle H1 at a point string ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm
R responds as follows:
1. If the query string already appears on the H-list in some tuple
hstring, ci, then algorithm R responds with H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random c ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hstring, ci
to the H1 -list and responds to A as H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
PSig Queries. For the i-th partial signing query on message mi , R checks
whether there is a tuple hmi , ai i in the H0 -list. If not, R generates a
random ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hmi , ai i to the H0 -list. R returns
((g 1/(x+si ) )ai , g si , usi ) to A as the reply for the partial signing query.
Res Queries. Given a resolution query (m, σP , PKi ) where PKi = (Xi , ui )
is the signer’s public key, algorithm R responds to this query as follows:
1. checks whether PVer(σP , m, PKi ) = >. If so, continues; otherwise,
R responds to A with a special symbol ⊥.
2. chooses at random s0 ∈ ZZp , Z ∈ G and computes (δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 ) :=
0
0
(Z, Y s , usi ) where m̄ is the complement message of m.
3. computes W = e(H1 (m̄), ui )/e(δ 0 , θ0 ).
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4. chooses uniformly at random c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ∈ ZZp , and adds
< m||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||e(δ 0 , ui )t0 W c0 ||g t1 Y c1 , c0 +c1 > to the H1 -list.
Since c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 are all randomly chosen, the probability that A
has previously asked a H1 query on the string m||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||
e(δ 0 , ui )t0 W c0 ||g t1 Y c1 is negligible.
5. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 , c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ) and returned to A as the reply of the resolution query.
• Game 1 (b = 1): R forwards PK := (X 0 , u) and APK = Y := g x to A
and simulates the oracles for A.
The H0 , H1 and resolution queries are simulated the same as in Game
0. For the i-th partial signing query on message mi , R checks whether
there is a tuple hmi , ai i in the H0 -list. If not, R generates a random
ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hmi , ai i to the H0 -list. R chooses at random
0
0
0
0
s0i ∈ ZZp and returns (g ai /(x +si ) , g si , usi ) to A as the reply for the partial
signing query.
It is easy to see that the above Hash queries, partial signing queries and
resolution queries are indistinguishably simulated. Finally, A halts. It either
admits failure, in which case so does R, or it returns a full signature σ ∗ on
message m∗ without asking the resolution oracle with respect to the message
m∗ and the challenge signer’s public key PK.
By the General Forking Lemma [21] (a standard rewinding technique in
random oracle model), with non-negligible probability algorithm R is able to
extracts the value x or x0 . The algorithm R wins if it extracts the value x.
Note that the adversary A can not distinguish between Game 0 and Game
1, because the distributions of the simulation in the two games are the same.
Therefore, if A succeeds with a non-negligible probability , the algorithm R
wins with a non-negligible probability.
2
Theorem 3. The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme is secure against
the arbitrator in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if the q-SDH
Assumption and q-HSDH assumption hold.
Proof. Suppose A makes q partial signing queries. Let mi be the i-th query
(i)
submitted by A, σP = (δi , vi , θi ) be the reply of the partial signing oracle
for the i-th query, and si be the exponent such that vi = g si . Finally the
adversary A outputs a full signature σ ∗ on message m∗ without asking the
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∗

∗

partial signing query on message m∗ . Let σP∗ = (δ ∗ , v ∗ , θ∗ ) = (δ ∗ , g s , us ) be
the partial signature contained in the full signature σ ∗ . Below we distinguish
two situations.
Type I: There exists 1 ≤ i ≤ q such that v ∗ = vi , which implies that
∗
s = si .
Type II: For all 1 ≤ i ≤ q, v ∗ 6= vi , which implies that s∗ 6∈ {s1 , · · · , sq }.
Type I adversary
Suppose the Type I adversary A breaks the security against the arbitrator
in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model. We show how to construct
an algorithm R to break the q-SDH Assumption. Recall that R is given
2
q
(g, g x , g x , · · · , g x ) as input, its goal is to output (g 1/(x+s) , s). R selects uniformly at random si ∈ ZZp used for answering the partial signing queries. Let
S = {s1 , · · · , sq } be the set of all si , and let S i = S \ {si }. R also uniformly
chooses i∗ ∈ [q]. Let S ∗ = S \ {si∗ }. Define
Y
Y
p∗ (η) =
(η + t), and p(η) =
(η + t).
t∈S ∗

t∈S

Note that deg(p∗ ) = q − 1 and deg(p) = q. Define
g0 = gp

∗ (x)

, h = g p(x) , X = g x .

R randomly chooses u ∈ G and sets PK := (X, u). R simulates the
challenger and answers the queries from A.
H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 .
Suppose A makes in total q0 distinct queries to the random oracle H0 . To
response to these queries, R independently and uniformly chooses j ∗ ∈ [q0 ]
and maintains a list of tuples hm0i , a0i i as explained below. We refer to this
list as H0 -list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the oracle H0 for
the j-th distinct message m0j ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the tuple hm0j , a0j i is on the H0 -list, algorithm R responds with
0
0
H(m0j ) = haj for j 6= j ∗ and H(mj 0 ) = g 0 haj for j = j ∗ .
2. Otherwise, if j 6= j ∗ , R generates a random a0j ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple
0
hm0j , a0j i to the H0 -list and responds to A as H(mj ) = haj . If i = j ∗ , R
generates a random a0j ∗ ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hm0j ∗ , a0j ∗ i to the H0 -list
0
and responds to A as H(mj ∗ ) = g 0 haj∗ .
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H1 Queries. A can also query the random oracle H1 . To response to these
queries, R maintains a list of tuples hstring (i) , c(i) i as explained below. We
refer to this list as H1 -list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the
oracle H1 at a point string ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the query string already appears on the H-list in some tuple hstring, ci,
then algorithm R responds with H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random c ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hstring, ci to
the H1 -list and responds to A as H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
PSig Queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that for each partial
signing query on a message mi , the adversary has previously asked a H0 query
on mi . Then for the i-th partial signing query, R finds the tuple hm0j , a0j i in
the H0 -list such that mi = m0j . If mi = m0j ∗ , R aborts and returns failure.
Otherwise R computes vi = g si , θi = usi and
0

0

δi = haj /(x+si ) = g aj
2

Q

t∈S i (x+t)

.

(1)
(i)

q

Since g x , g x , · · · , g x are known, R can generate the partial signature σP =
(δi , vi , θi ) without explicitly knowing the secret key x, but instead using the
right-hand side of (1) for computing δi .
Finally, the adversary A outputs a full signature σ ∗ on message m∗ without asking the partial signing query on message m∗ . From the full signature
∗
∗
query, R can gain a valid partial signature σP∗ = (δ ∗ , v ∗ , θ∗ ) = (δ ∗ , g s , us )
on message m∗ . If s∗ 6= si∗ or m∗ 6= m0j ∗ , R returns failure. Otherwise, we
∗
show R can computes a tuple (g 1/(x+s ) , s∗ ).
Note that
0

δ ∗ = (g 0 haj∗ )1/(x+si∗ ) = g p
0

From δ ∗ and the knowledge of g aj∗ p
0

δ 0 = (δ ∗ /g aj∗ p

∗ (x)

∗ (x)

∗ (x)/(x+s ∗ )
i

0

g aj∗ p

∗ (x)

.

, R can derive

) = gp

∗ (x)/(x+s ∗ )
i

.

Let p∗ (η)/(η + si∗ ) = p0 (η) + γ−1 /(η + si∗ ) for some polynomial p0 (η) of
q − 2 and some γ−1 ∈ ZZ∗p . Thus R can further derive
0

∗

δ 00 = (δ 0 /g p (x) )1/γ−1 = (g γ−1 /(x+si∗ ) )1/γ−1 = g 1/(x+s ) .
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Note that i∗ and j ∗ are uniformly chosen and independent of the adversary
A’s view, thus the case s∗ = si∗ or m∗ = m0j ∗ happens with a non-negligible
probability at least 1/qq0 , which means R can break the q-SDH assumption.
Type II adversary
Suppose the Type I adversary A breaks the security against the arbitrator
in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model. We show how to construct
an algorithm R to break the q-HSDH Assumption.
Note that algorithm R is given Q =< g, g x , u, {(g 1/(x+si ) , g si , usi )}qi=1 >.
Its goal is to output another distinct triple (g 1/(x+s) , g s , us ). R forwards
PK := (g x , u) to A and simulates the challenger and interacts with adversary
A as follows.
H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 . To
response to these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hmi , ai i as explained
below. We refer to this list as H0 -list. The list is initially empty. When A
queries the oracle H0 on a message mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as
follows:
1. If the query mi already appears on the H0 -list in some tuple hmi , ai i,
then algorithm R responds with H0 (mi ) = g ai ∈ ZZp .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hmi , ai i to
the H0 -list and responds to A as H0 (mi ) = g ai ∈ ZZp .
H1 Queries. A can also query the random oracle H1 . To response to these
queries, R maintains a list of tuples hstring (i) , c(i) i as explained below. We
refer to this list as H1 -list. The list is initially empty. When A queries the
oracle H1 at a point string ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as follows:
1. If the query string already appears on the H-list in some tuple hstring, ci,
then algorithm R responds with H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random c ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hstring, ci to
the H1 -list and responds to A as H(string) = c ∈ ZZp .
PSig Queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that for each partial
signing query on a message mi , the adversary has previously asked a H0 query
on mi . For the i-th partial signing query on message mi , R seek out the tuple
0
hm0j , a0j i in the H0 -list such that m0j = mi . R returns ((g 1/(x+si ) )aj , g si , usi )
to A as the reply for the partial signing query.
It is easy to see that the Hash queries and partial signing queries are
perfectly simulated. Finally, A halts. It either admits failure, in which case
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so does R, or it returns a full signature σ ∗ on message m∗ without asking
the partial signing query on message m∗ . From the full signature query, R
∗
∗
can gain a valid partial signature σP∗ = (δ ∗ , v ∗ , θ∗ ) = (δ ∗ , g s , us ) on message
m∗ . Due to the randomness of the outputs of H0 oracle, with overwhelming
probability A have submitted the message m∗ to the H0 oracle. Let H0 (m∗ ) =
g a where hm∗ , ai is stored in the H0 -list. Since s∗ 6∈ {s1 , · · · , sq }, R can
simply output ((δ ∗ )1/a , v ∗ , θ∗ ) and break the q-HSDH assumption.
The theorem follows from the two cases discussed above. The proof is
done.
2
5.2. An attack in our Enhanced Model
We will show the above concrete construction is insecure in our enhanced
model. The reason is that the signing oracle provides valuable information
to the adversary. Specifically, we show that if a dishonest arbitrator can
have access to the signer’s signing oracle, he can gain a partial signature on
message m̄ from a full signature generated by the signer on message m where
m̄ is the complement message of m. Since the arbitrator can easily convert a
partial signature into a full one, this means the arbitrator is able to generate
a full signature on the message m̄ without actually asking the corresponding
partial one on message m̄ from the partial signing oracle.
Recall that a full signature on message m comprises a partial signature
on message m, a designated confirmer signature on message m̄ with the
arbitrator being the designated confirmer, and a zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge that can be generated by using either the signer’s secret key or the
arbitrator’s secret key. If the arbitrator observes a full signature generated
by the signer on message m, then the arbitrator has a designated confirmer
signature on m̄. Being the designated confirmer, the arbitrator is able to turn
the designated confirmer signature into a conventional signature, which is
exactly a partial signature of the optimistic fair exchange scheme on message
m̄. With the partial signature on message m̄ in hand, the arbitrator can
further uniformly sample a designated confirmer signature and make a zeroknowledge proof of knowledge by using his own secret key. By doing this,
the arbitrator successfully generates a full signature on message m̄ without
asking the signer to generate the corresponding partial one.
Indeed, the arbitrator can ask the signer to generate a full signature on
a message m. Denote the full signature on m is (σP , δ 0 , γ 0 , θ0 , c0 , t0 , c1 , t1 ),
which is generated by the signer using algorithm Sig. Then the arbitrator
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can generater a full signature on message m̄ where m̄ is the complement
message of m as follows.
Compute σP = (δ 0 , (γ 0 )1/y , θ0 ).
Choose at random s ∈ ZZp , Z ∈ G and computes (δ, γ, θ) := (Z, Y s , usi ).
Compute W = e(H0 (m), ui )/e(δ, θ).
Choose uniformly at random r, c00 , t00 ∈ ZZp , and computes
0
0
0
0
c0 = H1 (m̄||PKi ||g t0 (Xi )c0 ||e(δ, ui )t0 W c0 ||g r ), c01 = c0 − c00 (mod p) and
t01 = r − c01 y (mod p).
5. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , δ, γ, θ, c00 , t00 , c01 , t01 ).

1.
2.
3.
4.

It is straightforward to check that σ is a valid signature on message m̄ under
the target signer’s public key PKi = (Xi , ui ).
6. The Insufficiency of Identical Distribution
In this section we show that even the resolved signature generated by the
arbitrator has the same distribution with the actual signatures generated by
the signer, it still makes a difference whether a malicious arbitrator is allowed
to have access to the signing oracle or not. We show this by proposing another
concrete counterexample.
The intuition of the concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme is as follows. The partial signature is the BLS signature [22], and the full signature
will be the partial signature plus the modified Bender-Katz-Morselli 2-user
ring signature between the signer and the arbitrator [23] (which can also be
viewed as Waters’s signature [24]). Note that in Waters’s signature scheme,
each user’s public key includes g1 , g2 and a set of Waters hash generators
u0 , u1 , · · · , un . In our OFE instantiation, we will let all the users share the
same Waters hash generators. Besides, we require that all users use the arbitrator’s public key as g2 so that each user can use a single key to generate
both the BLS signature and the modified Bender-Katz-Morselli 2-user ring
signature.
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p, g be a generator
of G, and e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT is a multiplicative group of order p. Let H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n
be two collision-resistant hash functions. We assume the public parameter
(G, p, e, H1 , H2 ) is shared by all users. The concrete OFE scheme is as follows.
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SetupTTP : The arbitrator chooses uniformly at random Waters hash generators u0 , u1 , · · · , un ← G and exponents y ← ZZp and sets Y = g y . APK is set
as (Y, u0 , u1 , · · · , un ). ASK is set as y.
SetupUser : User Ui chooses uniformly at random an exponent xi ← ZZp and
sets SKi = xi and PKi = g xi .
PSig(m, SKi , APK): To partially sign a message, the user Ui computes and
sets the partial signature as σP = H0 (m)xi .
PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK): Given a partial signature σP from user Ui , a verifier
verifies whether e(σP , g) = e(H0 (m), PKi ) holds. If so, it returns >; otherwise
it returns ⊥.
Sig(m, SKi , APK): To sign a message, the user Ui computes σP ← PSig(m, SKi ,
APK) and (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H1 (m||PKi ). It then chooses r ← ZZp and computes
n
Y
m
xi
0
S1 = Y · (u
uj j )r , and S2 = g r .
j=1

The full signature is set as σ = (σP , S1 , S2 ).
Ver(m, σP , PKi , AP K): Given a full signature σ from user Ui , a verifier verifies whether PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK) = > and whether
e(Y, PKi ) = e(S1 , g) ·

e(S2−1 , u0

n
Y

m

uj j ).

j=1

If both equations hold, it returns >; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Res(m, σP , ASK, PKi ): It first verifies whether σP is a valid partial signature
by running PVer(m, σP , PKi , APK). If σP is invalid, it returns ⊥. Otherwise,
it computes (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H1 (m||PKi ), chooses r ← ZZp , computes
S1 =

PKyi

0

· (u

n
Y

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r ,

j=1

and returns σ = (σP , S1 , S2 ).
It is not hard to verify that in the above construction, any (partial)
signature created by Sig (PSig) will be valid under Ver (PVer), and that any
signature created by the arbitrator using Res based on a partial signature
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generated by PSig will be valid under Ver. Thus the correctness property of
the above construction holds.
It is easy to see the actual signatures generated by the signer and the
resolved signatures generated by the arbitrator have an identical distribution,
thus the resolution ambiguity also holds.
6.1. Security Analysis
We show the specific construction is secure in the multi-user setting and
chosen-key model reviewed in Section 3.1. Intuitively, the security against
signers holds unconditionally as the arbitrator is always able to convert a
signer’s partial signature into a full one. The security against verifiers holds
due to unforgeability of the BLS signature and the modified Bender-KatzMorselli 2-user ring signature. The security against the arbitrator holds due
to the unforgeability of the BLS signature.
Theorem 4. The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme above is unconditionally secure against signers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key
model.
Proof. Obviously, for any message m and any valid signature σP on m under the verification key PKi , the arbitrator can always convert it into a full
signature by using its own secret key ASK. Therefore, the security against
signers always hold.
2
Theorem 5. The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme above is secure
against verifiers in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if CDH assumption holds in G.
Proof. Suppose an adversary A breaks the security against verifiers with
non-negligible probability. We show how to construct an algorithm R that
breaks the CDH assumption in G.
Note that algorithm R is given an CDH instance (G, p, g, A = g a , B = g b ).
Its goal is to output g ab . Algorithm R simulates the challenger and interacts
with adversary A. Let q be the number of different messages contained in
the queries A has made to the resolution oracle.
At the start, the algorithm R sets an integer, l = 4q, and chooses uniformly at random an integer, k ∗ between 0 and n. It then chooses an n-length
vector, ~x = (xi ), where the elements of ~x are chosen uniformly at random between 0 and l − 1 and a value, x0 , chosen uniformly at random between 0 and
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l−1. Besides, algorithm R chooses a random y 0 ∈ ZZp and an n-length vector,
~y = (yi ), where the elements of ~y are chosen at random in ZZp . Algorithm R
keeps these values private. Let e : G×G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT
is a multiplicative group of order p and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collisionresistant hash function. Algorithm R sets PK := A and APK = Y := B
∗
0
0
and assigns the Waters hash generators parameters u0 = B p−k m+x g y and
ui = B xi g yi . Algorithm R forwards PK, APK and the public parameters
(G, p, e, H0 , H1 , u0 , u1 , · · · , un ) to the adversary. From the view of the adversary, the distribution of the simulated public parameters is identical to the
real construction. We view the hash function H0 as a random oracle.
For ease of analysis we define the following functions where m̃ is the set
of indices i such that mi = 1 while H1 (m) = (m1 , · · · , mn ) :
X
X
yi .
xi , and J(m) = y 0 +
F (m) = (p − mk ∗ ) + x0 +
i∈m̃

i∈m̃

We also define a binary function K(m) as

P
0, if x0 + i∈m̃ xi ≡ 0
K(m) =
1, otherwise

(mod l)

.

H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 . To
response to these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hMi , ai i as explained
below. We refer to this list as H0 -list. The list is initially empty. When A
queries the oracle H0 on a message Mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ , algorithm R responds as
follows:
1. If the query Mi already appears on the H0 -list in some tuple hMi , ai i,
then algorithm R responds with H(Mi ) = g ai .
2. Otherwise, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hMi , ai i to
the H0 -list and responds to A as H(Mi ) = g ai .
PSig Queries. For the i-th partial signing query on message Mi , R checks
whether there is a tuple hMi , ai i in the H0 -list. If not, R generates a random
ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hMi , ai i to the H0 -list. R returns Aai to A as the
reply for the partial signing query.
Res Queries. Given a resolution query (m, σP , PKi ) where PKi could be PK
or could be adversarially-generated by the adversary, algorithm R responds
to this query as follows:
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1. checks whether PVer(σP , m, PKi ) = >. If so, continues; otherwise, R
responds to A with a special symbol ⊥.
2. chooses a random r ∈ ZZp , and computes the signature as
−J(m||PKi )
F (m||PKi )

S1 = g1

(u0

−1
F (m||PKi )

Y

ui )r , S2 = g1

gr .

˜ i
i∈m||PK

3. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , S1 , S2 ) and returned to A as the
reply of the resolution query.
Let r̃ = r −

α
F (m||PKi )

and PKi = g α . Then we have

−J(m||PKi )
F (m||PKi )

S1 = PKi

−J(m||PKi )
F (m||PKi )

= PKi

(u0

Y
˜ i
i∈m||PK

ui )r

(B F (m||PKi ) g J(m||PKi ) )r
−

α

= B α (B F (m||PKi ) g J(m||PKi ) ) F (m||PKi ) (B F (m||PKi ) g J(m||PKi ) )r
Y
α
r−
= B α (u0
ui ) F (m||PKi )
˜
i∈m||PKi
Y
α 0
= B (u
ui )r̃
˜
i∈m||PKi

Additionally, we have
−1
F (m||PKi )

S2 = g1

gr = g

α
r− F (m||PK

i)

= g r̃ .

Algorithm R will be able to perform this computation if and only if
F (m||PKi ) 6= 0 mod p.
Finally the adversary A halts. It either admits failure, in which case
so does R, or it returns a full signature σ ∗ = (σP∗ , S1∗ , S2∗ ) on message m∗
without asking the resolution oracle with respect to the message m∗ and the
challenge signer’s public key PK. Due to the collision-resistant property of
the hash function, H1 (m∗ ||PK) 6= H(m||PKi ) for any message m and PKi
˜
that had been submitted to the resolution query before. Let m∗ ||PK
be
∗
∗
∗
∗
the set
of
indices
i
such
that
m
=
1
where
H(m
||PK)
=
(m
,
·
·
·
,
m
).
If
i
1
n
P
0
∗
x + i∈m∗ ˜||PK xi = k m, then we have
e(

S1∗

P
, g)
y+ i∈m∗˜||PK yi

(S2∗ )

=

m∗j
j=1 uj )
P
y+ i∈m∗˜||PK yi
e((S2∗ )
, g)

e(A, B)e(S2∗ , u0
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Qn

= e(A, B).

Therefore algorithm R can solve the CDH problem by computing g ab as
g ab =

S∗
P1
.
y+ i∈m∗˜||PK yi
(S2∗ )

Similar to [24], the probability that the simulator
P does not abort during
simulating the signing oracle and the equation x0 + i∈m∗ ˜||PK xi = k ∗ m holds
1
is at least λ = 8(n+1)q
, which is non-negligible. This completes the proof. 2
Theorem 6. The concrete optimistic fair exchange scheme above is secure
against the arbitrator in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model if the
CDH assumption holds in G.
Proof. Suppose an adversary breaks the security against verifiers with nonnegligible probability. We show how to construct an algorithm R that breaks
the CDH assumption in G.
Note that algorithm R is given an CDH instance (G, p, g, A = g a , B = g b ).
Its goal is to output g ab . The algorithm R chooses uniformly at random
u0 , u1 , · · · , un ∈ G. Let e : G × G → GT be a bilinear pairing where GT is
a multiplicative group of order p and H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n be a collisionresistant hash function. Algorithm R sets PK := A and forwards PK and the
public parameters (G, p, e, H0 , H1 , u0 , u1 , · · · , un ) to the adversary A. From
the view of the adversary, the distribution of the simulated public parameters
is identical to the real construction. We view the hash function H0 as a
random oracle. Suppose the adversary A makes in total q different queries
to the random oracle. At the start, the algorithm R chooses uniformly at
random an integer k ∗ such that 1 ≤ k ∗ ≤ q.
H0 Queries. At any time adversary A can query the random oracle H0 . To
response to these queries, R maintains a list of tuples hMi , ai i as explained
below. We refer to this list as H0 -list. The list is initially empty. When
A makes the i different queries the oracle H0 on a message Mi ∈ {0, 1}∗ ,
algorithm R responds as follows:
1. R checks whether i = k ∗ . If so, R returns B to A as the reply and
adds the tuple hMi , Bi to the H0 -list.
2. Otherwise, R generates a random ai ∈ ZZp , adds the tuple hMi , ai i to
the H0 -list and responds to A as H(Mi ) = g ai .
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PSig Queries. Without loss of generality, we assume that for each partial
signing query, the adversary A has previously submitted the corresponding
message to the H0 query. For a partial signing query on message M , R checks
the H0 -list. Suppose M = Mi where Mi is the i-th different query A has
made to the H0 oracle. If i = k ∗ , R aborts and returns failure. Otherwise,
R returns Aai to A as the reply for the partial signing query.
Finally A outputs (m∗ , σ ∗ ) such that m∗ is not queried to the partial
signing oracle. Since k ∗ is chosen uniformly at random and independent of
the adversary A’s behavior, thus with non-negligible probability at least 1/q
we have m∗ = Mk∗ , in which case σ ∗ = g ab . Thus algorithm R can outputs
2
σ ∗ and breaks the CDH assumption with non-negligible probability.
6.2. An attack in our Enhanced Model
The malicious arbitrator can always sign on behalf the signer as follows
when it is provided the signing oracle. The reason that an adversary can
succeed in our enhanced model is that the signing oracle can provide useful
information to the adversary. Specifically, the adversary can forge a new
signature as follows.
1. The arbitrator computes Y = H0 (m∗ ) where m∗ is the message the
arbitrator tries to forge a signature on. Besides, the arbitrator chooses
0
uniformly at random x0 , x1 , · · · , xn ∈ ZZp and sets u0 = g x , u1 =
g x1 , · · · , un = g xn . The public key APK is set as (Y, u0 , u1 , · · · , un ).
Note that APK is malicious generated in the sense that the arbitrator
does not know the corresponding secret key of Y .
2. Let the challenger’s public key is X = g x . The arbitrator asks a signing
query on a message m 6= m∗ , and gains a ring signature
x

S1 = Y · (u

0

n
Y

m

uj j )r , and S2 = g r ,

j=1

where (m1 , · · · , mn ) ← H1 (m||X).
3. With the knowledge of x0 , x1 , · · · , xn , the arbitrator computes
n
Y
0
A = (S2 )
(S2 )xj mj
x0

j=1

and therefore Y x = S1 /A.
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4. The arbitrator sets σP := Y x , chooses at random r0 ∈ ZZp , and computes
n
Y
m0 0
0
uj j )r , and S20 = g r ,
S10 = Y x · (u0
j=1

← H1 (m∗ ||X).
where
5. The full signature is set as σ := (σP , S10 , S20 ).
(m01 , · · ·

, m0n )

It is not hard to check that σ is a valid signature on message m∗ under
the target signer’s public key X and the arbitrator has not makes a partial
signing query on the message m∗ .
7. Previous Paradigms Revisited
In this section, we address the basic theoretical question, namely whether
or not a scheme satisfying the security notions exists. We revisit two previous known paradigms for constructing optimistic fair exchange schemes and
evaluate their security in our enhanced model.
7.1. Verifiably Encrypted Signature Paradigm
Dodis, Lee and Yum [10] showed optimistic fair exchange schemes secure
in the multi-user setting can be constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures. Subsequently, Huang et al. [11] showed this generic construction also
works in the chosen-key model. The generic construction of optimistic fair
exchange schemes based on verifiably encrypted signatures [10] is as follows.
Let E = (KGen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme, and S = (KGen,
Sig, Ver) be a signature scheme. Given an encryption key pair (ek, dk)
and a signature key pair (sk, vk), we let Π be a simulation-sound [25]
non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system for the NP-language
L = {(c, m, ek, vk)|∃σ [c = E.Enc(σ, ek) ∧ S.Ver(m, σ, vk) = 1]}. Intuitively,
the partial signature of the generic optimistic fair exchange scheme is the
encryption of the signer’s signature plus a non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof showing that the ciphertext is correctly generated. The full signature
is the signer’s signature. Below is the generic construction of optimistic fair
exchange schemes from verifiably encrypted signatures.
• SetupTTP : The arbitrator runs (ek, dk) ← S.KGen(1k ) and sets ASK =
dk and APK = ek.
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• SetupUser : Each user Ui runs (ski , vki ) ← S.KGen(1k ) and sets (SKi ,
PKi ) = (ski , vki ).
• Sig: To sign a message m, the user Ui runs s ← S.Sig(ski , m). The full
signature is set as σ = s.
• Ver: To verify whether a full signature σ is generated by user Ui , a
verifier checks whether the output of S.Ver(m, σ, vki ) is valid or not. If
valid, return >. Otherwise, return ⊥.
• PSig: To partially sign a message m, the user Ui runs s ← S.Sig(ski , m)
and c ← E.Enc(s, ek) and generates a proof π showing (c, m, ek, vki ) ∈
L. The partial signature is set as σP = (c, π).
• PVer: To verify whether a partial signature σP = (c, π) is generated
by user Ui on message m, the verifier checks whether the proof π for
the statement (c, m, ek, vki ) ∈ L is valid or not. If valid, return >.
Otherwise, return ⊥.
• Res: For a partial signature σP = (c, π) generated by the user Ui on
message m, the arbitrator checks whether PVer(m, σP , ASK, PKi ) =
>. If so, the arbitrator runs s ← E.Dec(dk, c) and returns σ = s.
Otherwise, the arbitrator returns ⊥.
The correctness property of this construction follows from the correctness
of the signature scheme S, the correctness of the encryption scheme E, and
the completeness of the NIZK proof system Π, which states that if the statement is true, the honest verifier will be convinced of this fact by an honest
prover.
The resolution ambiguity property holds due to the fact that a partial
signature is a verifiably encryption of a full signature and the resolution
process is just a decryption of the partial signature.
For the security analysis, the simulation-sound property [25] is required.
Intuitively, the simulation-sound property states that a probabilistic polynomial time adversary is incapable of convincing others of a false statement even
after seeing a simulated proof of its choice. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 7. If S is UF-CMA-secure signature scheme [26], E is a CCA2secure encryption scheme [27], and Π is a simulation-sound NIZK proof system, then the above optimistic fair exchange scheme constructed from verifiably encrypted signatures is secure in our enhanced model.
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Proof. Security against Signers. The proof about security against signers is
the same as that in [10], and therefore we omit it.
Security against verifiers. Suppose an adversary A breaks the security against
verifiers by outputting (m∗ , σ ∗ ). If A has not made a partial signing query
on message m∗ , the analysis of this type of attack is covered in the security
against the arbitrator to be discussed later. Thus without loss of generality,
we assume that A has made the query m∗ to the partial signing oracle OPSig .
In this setting, we show how to construct an algorithm B that breaks the
CCA2-security of the encryption scheme E. Recall that B gets ek as input
and has access to the decryption oracle ODec . B runs (sk, vk) ← S.KGen(1k )
and sets PK = vk, APK = ek. B forwards PK and APK to A and simulates
the oracles for A.
Let q be the total number of OPSig queries made by A. To reply to the
i-th query mi to the partial signing oracle OPSig , B uniformly chooses j from
{1, 2, · · · , q} and does as follows.
• If i = j, B randomly chooses a message m̄0 , and computes s̄0 =
S.Sig(sk, m̄0 ) and s̄1 = S.Sig(sk, mj ). B submits (s̄0 , s̄1 ) to its own
challenger. Let c̄b be the challenge ciphertext returned by B’s own
challenger, which is either E.Enc(s̄0 , ek) or E.Enc(s̄1 , ek). B further
simulates a proof πj showing (c̄b , mj , ek, vk) ∈ L. B forwards (c̄b , πj )
to A the reply of this query.
• If i 6= j, B computes si = S.Sig(sk, mi ), ci = E.Enc(si , ek) and generates a proof showing that (ci , mi , ek, vk) ∈ L. The reply of this query
is (ci , πi ).
To simulate a query m to the signing oracle OSig , B computes s =
S.Sig(sk, m) and returns s as the reply.
To simulate a query (m, (c, π), PKi ) to the resolution oracle ORes , B does
as follows.
• If π is valid and c 6= c̄b , B submits c to its own decryption oracle ODec .
Let the reply be s. B forwards s to A as the reply.
• If π is valid and c = c̄b . B further checks whether m = mj , PKi =
PK and π = πj . If so, B aborts and outputs a random bit to its
CCA challenger. Otherwise, by the simulation-sound property of Π,
the decryption of c must be a valid signature on message m under the
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public key PKi . Suppose S.Ver(m, s̄b , PKi ) = > where b ∈ {0, 1}. B
returns s̄b to A and at the same time outputs the bit b to its own CCA
challenger.
• If π is invalid, B returns ⊥.
Note that if the challenge ciphertext c̄b is the encryption of s̄0 (i.e., b=0),
cj has no information on the signature of mj and A’s chance of outputting a
signature on message mj under PK is negligible. If the challenge ciphertext is
the encryption of s̄1 (i.e., b=1), then the simulated environment is indistinguishable with that in the real attack environment and with non-negligible
probability A outputs a signature on message mj . Thus if A’s final output
(m∗ , σ ∗ ) satisfy m∗ = mj , B outputs 1 and otherwise B outputs a random
bit to its CCA challenger. It is easy to see that if A can forge a full signature
with non-negligible probability, then B can break the CCA2-security of the
encryption scheme E with at least non-negligible probability.
Security against the arbitrator. To show security against the arbitrator,
we convert any arbitrator A that breaks the security against the arbitrator
into an adversary B that forges a new signature for the underlying signature
scheme S. The adversary B, on input vk, sets PK = vk, receives APK from
A and simulates the environments for A. To respond to a partial signing
query on message m, B asks a signature s from its own signing oracle on
message m, computes c = E.Enc(s, APK) and generates a proof showing
(c, m, APK, vk) ∈ L. To respond to a signing query on message m, B asks a
signature s from its own signing oracle on message m and returns s to A as
the reply. The simulation is perfect and finally A outputs (m∗ , σ ∗ ) such that
m∗ is not an input to the partial signing oracle or the signing oracle. Thus
B can simply win by outputting (m∗ , σ ∗ ).
2
7.2. Conventional Signature and Ring signature Paradigm
Since the optimistic fair exchange schemes resulted from verifiably encrypted signatures may not be efficient in the standard model due to the
involvement of a simulation-sound proof, Huang et al. [11] suggested another generic methodology for constructing optimistic fair exchange schemes
secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model. The generic construction is built on conventional signatures and ring signature.
Let S = (KGen, Sig, Ver) be a conventional signature scheme, and RS =
(KGen, Sig, Ver) be a ring signature scheme. In Huang et al.’s generic construction, each signer has two key pairs, one for the conventional signature
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scheme S and the other for the ring signature scheme RS. The arbitrator
has only a key pair for the ring signature scheme RS. The partial signature
is a conventional signature σ 0 generated by the signature scheme S. The
full signature σ is the partial signature σ 0 plus a 2-user ring signature σr
generated by the ring signature scheme RS with the ring members consist
of the signer and the arbitrator. To convert a partial signature into a full
one, the arbitrator simply produces a ring signature σr using its secret key
with the ring numbers being the signer and the arbitrator. We review the
construction as follows.
• SetupTTP : The arbitrator runs (ask, apk) ← RS.KGen(1k ) and sets
(ASK, APK) := (ask,apk).
• SetupUser : Each user Ui runs (ski , pk i ) ← S.KGen(1k ), (rski , rpki ) ←
RS.KGen(1k ), and sets (SKi , PKi ) := ((sk i , rski ), (pk i , rpki )).
• Sig: To sign a full signature on message m, user Ui runs σ 0 ← S.Sig(ski ,
m) and σr ← RS.Sig(rski , m||PKi , R)2 where R := {rpki , apk}. The
full signature is then set as σ := (σ 0 , σr ).
• Ver: To verify whether a full signature σ := (σ 0 , σr ) is generated by user
Ui on message m, the verifier checks whether both S.Ver(m, σ 0 , pki ) = >
and RS.Ver(m||PKi , σr , R) = > where R := {rpki , apk}. If so, it returns
>; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
• PSig: To partially sign a full signature on message m, user Ui runs
σ 0 ← S.Sig(ski , m), and returns σ 0 as the partial signature.
• PVer: To verify whether a partial signature σP := σ 0 is generated by
user Ui on message m, a verifier returns S.Ver(m, σ 0 , pki ).
• Res: For a partial signature σP := σ 0 generated by the user Ui on
message m, the arbitrator first checks the validity of σ 0 by running
S.Ver(m, σ 0 , pki ). If σ 0 is invalid, it returns ⊥; otherwise, it computes
σr ← RS.Sig(ask, m||PKi , R), where R := {rpki , apk}. The arbitrator
returns σ := (σ 0 , σr ).
2

In Huang et al.’s construction, the ring signature is computed as σr ←
RS.Sig(rski , m||σ 0 ||PKi , R). We will later show it would suffice even if we sign on a shorter
message string m||PKi rather than m||σ 0 ||PKi .
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The correctness property of the construction from this paradigm holds
due to correctness of the conventional signature scheme S and the ring signature scheme RS. The resolution ambiguity property follows the anonymity
requirement of the ring signature scheme RS. For the security analysis, we
require the ring signature to be unforgeable under an adaptive attack against
a static adversary, a ring signature model which was proposed in [28].
Theorem 8. If S is a conventional signature scheme that is UF-CMA-secure,
and RS is a secure ring signature scheme with basic anonymity and existential unforgeability under an adaptive attack against a static adversary, then
the above optimistic fair exchange scheme constructed from conventional signatures and ring signatures is secure in our enhanced model.
Proof. Security against signers. The proof about security against signers is
the same as that in [10], and therefore we omit it.
Security against verifiers. Suppose that an adversary A breaks the security
against verifiers. We show how to construct an algorithm B that breaks the
unforgeability of RS under an adaptive attack against a static adversary.
Given two public keys pk0 and pk1 , which are challenge public keys, B
runs (sk, pk) ← S.KGen(1k ), and sets APK := pk1 and PK := (pk, pk0 ). B
forwards to A (PK, APK) and simulates the oracles for A.
When A makes a partial signing query m to oracle OPSig , B computes
and returns S.Sig(sk, m) to A.
When A makes a signing query m to oracle OPSig , B firstly runs σ 0 ←
S.Sig(sk, m) and gains a ring signature σr on message m||PK under the ring
{pk0 , pk1 } generated using the secret key corresponding to pk0 from its own
ring signing oracle. B forwards (σ 0 , σr ) to A as the reply.
When A makes a resolution query (m, σ 0 , PK0i ) where PK0i := (pki0 , rpki0 ) to
oracle ORes , B checks whether PVer(m, σ 0 , PK0i , APK) = >. If not, B returns
⊥ to A. Otherwise, B gains a ring signature σr on message m||PK0i under the
ring {rpki0 , pk1 } generated using the secret key corresponding to pk1 from its
own ring signing oracle. B forwards (σ 0 , σr ) to A.
The simulation is perfect. Finally, A outputs its forgery (m̃, σ̃), where
σ̃ = (σ̃ 0 , σ̃r ). Thus we have RS.Ver(m̃||PK, σ̃r , R) = > where R := {pk0 , pk1 }.
Since (m̃, ·, PK) 6∈ Query(A, OSig ) and (m̃, ·, PK) 6∈ Query(A, ORes ), B has
never issued the query on message m̃||PK under the ring {pk0 , pk1 } to its
own ring signing oracle. Therefore σ̃r is a valid ring signature on a new
message m̃||PK under the ring {pk0 , pk1 }. B can simply output (m̃||PK, σ̃r )
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and break the existential unforgeability under an adaptive attack against a
static adversary.
Security against the arbitrator. Suppose that an adversary A breaks the
security against the arbitrator. We show how to construct an algorithm B
that breaks the unforgeability of S. Recall that B gets vk as input and has
access to its own signing oracle Osk . B runs (rsk, rpk) ← RS.KGen(1k ) and
forwards PK := (vk, rpk) to A, who returns to B the public arbitration key
APK. To respond to a partial signing query on message m, B asks a signature
s from its own signing oracle Osk on message m, and returns s to A as the
reply. To respond to a signing query on message m, B asks a signature s
from its own signing oracle on message m, runs σr ← RS.Sig(rsk, m||PK, R)
where R = {rpk, APK} and returns (s, σr ) to A as the reply. The simulation
is perfect and finally A outputs (m̃, σ̃), where σ̃ = (σ̃ 0 , σ̃r ) such that m̃ is not
queried to neither the partial signing oracle nor the signing oracle. Thus B
can simply break the unforgeability of S by outputting (m̃, σ̃ 0 ).
2
8. Conclusion
Defining proper security models capturing possible realistic powers of an
adversary is of significant importance in the study of optimistic fair exchange.
In this paper we identified that the existing models failed to capture the
reality that an adversary can have access to full signatures generated by the
signer. We made an observation that the previous perception that a signing
oracle can be simulated by the partial signing oracle and resolution oracle is
indeed insufficient. That is to say, existing models are incomplete as they
deprived dishonest users of the chance of observing the challenge signer’s
actual signatures. To make existing models more practical and complete,
we proposed an enhanced model for optimistic fair exchange that explicitly
provides the adversary with the signing oracle. Separations between existing
chosen-key model and our model were demonstrated. Finally, we revisited
two well-known approaches for constructing optimistic fair exchange schemes
and showed that fortunately the two methodologies remain secure in our
enhanced model.
[1] N. Asokan, M. Schunter, M. Waidner, Optimistic protocols for fair
exchange, in: Proc. 4th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 8–17.

37

[2] X. Huang, Y. Mu, W. Susilo, W. Wu, J. Zhou, R. H. Deng, Preserving
transparency and accountability in optimistic fair exchange of digital
signatures, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 6
(2011) 498–512.
[3] N. Asokan, V. Shoup, M. Waidner, Optimistic fair exchange of digital
signatures, Advances in Cryptology-Eurocrypt 1998, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science 1403 (1998) 591 – 606.
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[8] M. Rückert, D. Schröder, Security of verifiably encrypted signatures
and a construction without random oracles, in: Proceedings of the
3rd International Conference Palo Alto on Pairing-Based Cryptography,
Pairing ’09, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 17–34.
[9] Y. Dodis, L. Reyzin, Breaking and repairing optimistic fair exchange
from podc 2003, in: Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Digital
rights management, DRM ’03, ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2003, pp.
47–54.
[10] Y. Dodis, P. J. Lee, D. H. Yum, Optimistic fair exchange in a multi-user
setting, in: Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Practice
38

and theory in public-key cryptography, PKC’07, Springer-Verlag, Berlin,
Heidelberg, 2007, pp. 118–133.
[11] Q. Huang, G. Yang, D. S. Wong, W. Susilo, Efficient optimistic fair
exchange secure in the multi-user setting and chosen-key model without
random oracles, in: Proceedings of the 2008 The Cryptopgraphers’
Track at the RSA conference on Topics in cryptology, CT-RSA’08,
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2008, pp. 106–120.
[12] H. Zhu, W. Susilo, Y. Mu, Multi-party stand-alone and setup-free verifiably committed signatures, in: [29], pp. 134–149.
[13] B. Barak, R. Canetti, J. B. Nielsen, R. Pass, Universally composable
protocols with relaxed set-up assumptions., in: FOCS’04, pp. 186–195.
[14] D. Boneh, M. K. Franklin, Identity-based encryption from the weil
pairing, in: J. Kilian (Ed.), CRYPTO, volume 2139 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer, 2001, pp. 213–229.
[15] D. Boneh, X. Boyen, Short signatures without random oracles and the
sdh assumption in bilinear groups, J. Cryptology 21 (2008) 149–177.
[16] X. Boyen, B. Waters, Full-domain subgroup hiding and constant-size
group signatures, in: [29], pp. 1–15.
[17] Q. Huang, D. S. Wong, Short convertible undeniable signature in the
standard model, in: F. Bao, J. Weng (Eds.), ISPEC, volume 6672 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2011, pp. 257–272.
[18] D. Hofheinz, E. Kiltz, Programmable hash functions and their applications, J. Cryptology 25 (2012) 484–527.
[19] Q. Huang, D. S. Wong, W. Susilo, Efficient designated confirmer signature and dcs-based ambiguous optimistic fair exchange, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 6 (2011) 1233–1247.
[20] D. Chaum, Designated confirmer signatures, in: A. D. Santis (Ed.), EUROCRYPT, volume 950 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer,
1994, pp. 86–91.

39

[21] M. Bellare, G. Neven, Multi-signatures in the plain public-key model and
a general forking lemma, in: Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security, CCS ’06, ACM, New York,
NY, USA, 2006, pp. 390–399.
[22] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, H. Shacham, Short signatures from the weil pairing,
J. Cryptology 17 (2004) 297–319.
[23] A. Bender, J. Katz, R. Morselli, Ring signatures: Stronger definitions, and constructions without random oracles, in: S. Halevi, T. Rabin (Eds.), TCC, volume 3876 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer, 2006, pp. 60–79.
[24] B. Waters, Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles,
in: R. Cramer (Ed.), EUROCRYPT, volume 3494 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, Springer, 2005, pp. 114–127.
[25] A. Sahai, Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive
chosen-ciphertext security, in: Proceedings of the 40th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS ’99, IEEE Computer
Society, Washington, DC, USA, 1999, pp. 543–553.
[26] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, R. L. Rivest, A digital signature scheme secure
against adaptive chosen-message attacks, SIAM J. Comput. 17 (1988)
281–308.
[27] C. Rackoff, D. R. Simon, Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and chosen ciphertext attack, in: Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology,
CRYPTO ’91, Springer-Verlag, London, UK, UK, 1992, pp. 433–444.
[28] X. Boyen, Mesh signatures, in: M. Naor (Ed.), EUROCRYPT, volume
4515 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2007, pp. 210–227.
[29] T. Okamoto, X. Wang (Eds.), Public Key Cryptography - PKC 2007,
10th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public-Key
Cryptography, Beijing, China, April 16-20, 2007, Proceedings, volume
4450 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 2007.

40

